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Project

- Approaching the economics of foundational resources from the demand side
 - Where does the value come from?
- Interdisciplinary
 - law and economics
 - many disciplines within law
 - many disciplines within economics

Introduction

Part I: Foundations

Chapter One: Defining Infrastructure and Commons Management

Chapter Two: Overview of Infrastructure Economics

Chapter Three: Microeconomic Building Blocks

Part II: A Demand-Side Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management

Chapter Four: Infrastructural Resources

Chapter Five: Managing Infrastructure as Commons

Part III: Complications

Chapter Six: Commons Management and Infrastructure Pricing

Chapter Seven: Managing Congestion

Chapter Eight: Supply-Side Incentives

Part IV: Traditional Infrastructure

Chapter Nine: Transportation Infrastructure : Roads

Chapter Ten: Communications Infrastructure : Telecommunications

Part V: Nontraditional Infrastructure

Chapter Eleven: Environmental Infrastructure

Chapter Twelve: Intellectual Infrastructure

Part VI: Modern Debates

Chapter Thirteen: The Internet and the Network Neutrality Debate


Chapter Fourteen: Application to Other Modern Debates



Conclusion

- Simple thesis:
 - If Infrastructure, then commons?
 - *NO: Too simple!*
 - *But decent organizing principle*
- More complicated set of arguments:
 - Depends upon the mix of outputs
 - Infrastructure typology helps sort arguments
 - Need to consider value of commons management more carefully

Infrastructural Resources


1. The resource may be consumed nonrivalrously,
2. social demand for the resource is driven primarily by downstream productive activity that requires the resource as an input, and
3. the resource is used as an input into a wide range of goods and services, including private goods, public goods and/or social goods.





Demand side problems?

- Public and Social Infrastructures
 - Market bias / Optimization for
 - Applications/uses that generate observable and appropriable value (rather than spillovers)
 - Known or expected applications/uses
 - Demand manifestation problems may lead to undersupply of public and social goods and/or misoptimization of infrastructure



- Commons alleviates the need to rely on either the market mechanism or the government to “pick winners”
 - Market allocates access to infrastructure based on appropriability of returns from outputs
 - Could rely on the government to figure out which public good or social good outputs are worthy of subsidization or special treatment
- Social option
 - high uncertainty regarding which users or uses will generate social value

Essential Facilities Doctrine ...

- Frischmann & Waller, *Revitalizing Essential Facilities*, 75 Antitrust L.J. 1-66 (2008)
- Demand-side screen that narrows yet revitalizes ...

Internet Search Context ...

- Infrastructure commons framework
- Antitrust law framework
- Compare Google Search w/ Google Books