Dynamic Competition and Current Merger Policy
Event Date: Wednesday, December 14, 2011
Location: George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, Virginia
Program Description: Traditional merger analysis focuses on the degree to which a combination of producers is likely to lessen competition on price, output, and quality. The relationship between short-run market performance and innovation, however, is uncertain. In "Schumpeterian" competition, markets may be characterized by high degrees of concentration, but competition is still vibrant as firms jockey to displace the market leader through innovation. Thus, placing too much emphasis on short-run indicia of competition in dynamic industries may harm consumers in the long run. Recent high-profile mergers in rapidly evolving industries have brought the potential conflicts between the goals of promoting short-run competition and innovation into relief.
This program will examine topics such as:
For More Information, Contact:
Henry G. Manne Programs
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